The Cybersecurity Canon: Winning As a CISO

The Cybersecurity Canon is official, and you can now see our website here. We modeled it after the Baseball or Rock & Roll Hall-of-Fame, except for cybersecurity books. We have 20 books on the initial candidate list but we are soliciting help from the cybersecurity community to increase the number to be much more than that. Please write a review and nominate your favorite. 

The Cybersecurity Canon is a real thing for our community. We have designed it so that you can directly participate in the process. Please do so!

Book Review: Winning as a CISO (2005) by Rich Baich

Executive Summary

The latest candidate for the Cybersecurity Canon is Rich Baich’s Winning as a CISO. The roles of the chief information officer (CIO), the chief security officer (CSO), and the chief information security officer (CISO) in the modern enterprise have been constantly changing since we invented the need for such roles in the 1980s and 1990s. By the mid-2000s, the industry had settled on tucking the security function for an organization under the IT function of an organization. In other words, the CISO works for the CIO.

But Baich is an innovative thinker. He has looked at how the CISO role has evolved over the years and makes a pretty good case for where it needs to go next. By asking questions about the appropriate supervisor for a CISO, a CISO’s needed skill set, and ways to approach the CISO job function, Baich breaks new ground on how the industry should views these topics. Our industry will be slow to adopt these new ideas, but with the rash of highly publicized and impactful data breaches to the retail sector in 2014, perhaps the industry is ready to start making a change. Reviewing Baich’s book is a good place to start. It is Cybersecurity Canon-worthy, and you should have read it by now.

Introduction

The roles of the CIO, the CSO, and the CISO in the modern enterprise have been constantly changing since we invented the need for such roles in the 1980s and 1990s. I picked upWinning as a CISO because my boss handed it to me after he met the author, Rich Baich, at a security event. He said that Baich was a smart guy and had some interesting ideas about what modern CISOs in today’s environments about the modern CISO role in today’s environments. In this book, Baich explains some innovative thinking about what today’s CISOs should be responsible for, how they should fit into the organization, and how they might accomplish their tasks once they are established. In order to understand where Baich is coming from, it is useful to review the history of the CIO, CSO, and CISO roles in modern business.

CIO, CSO and CISO History

The idea of the C-suite did not really materialize until the 1920s when Alfred Sloan, the hugely successful chief executive officer (CEO) of General Motors, decided to distribute profit and loss (P&L) responsibility across his division managers in response to shareholder and regulator demand for more accountability.

Because of General Motors’ success with this new P&L model, business leaders across the world adopted it for their own organizations. That model lasted some 60 years until the 1980swhen CEOs realized that in order to drive organizational change, they needed executives with technical and functional specialties. CEOs began creating new C-level executive positions like chief marketing officers (CMOs), chief financial officers (CFOs), and, yes, CIOs. The idea of a C-level executive dedicated to security did not really emerge until the late 1990s, 10 years after the CIO position had become firmly established in modern business.

Steve Katz became the first CISO in 1995 when Citigroup created the role to respond to a highly publicized Russian malware incident. Since then, the security industry specifically and business leadership in general have been thinking and rethinking the need and the responsibilities for such a person.

The first practitioners came out of the technical ranks. Vendor solutions to mitigate the cyber threat ran on networks and workstations. In order to manage those solutions, it was helpful to have people who understood that world, but this was a new thing for the techies; trying to translate technical risk to a business leader did not always go very well. Security techies have always been, and still are, passionate about their responsibilities. The early trailblazers tended to say “no” to any new project because of the potential security risk. The business leaders did not want to deal with these people who wanted to make organizational decisions with no thought about the bottom line. It became convenient to tuck these kinds of people underneath the CIO organization. CISOs began working for the CIO because, from the C-suite perspective, all of that technical stuff belonged in one basket, and the security people did not know how to talk to the business people.

As business leaders began applying resources to mitigate cyber risk, other areas of security risk started to emerge: physical security, compliance, fraud prevention, business continuity, safety, ethics, privacy, brand protection, etc. The idea of the CSO role began to gain popularity with business leaders because they needed someone to look at the entire business, not just cybersecurity risk to the business, but general security risk to the business. CSO Magazinelaunched in 2002 to cater to that crowd.

By the mid-2000s, the industry had settled on tucking the security function for an organization under the IT function for an organization. In other words, the CISO works for the CIO. This is not bad, per se, and this arrangement works in many organizations. The IT folks generally handle the daily automation functions while the security teams have more of an oversight role in terms of security architecture, policy, risk assessment, and security operations.

But since then, the industry has been in flux. Not every company is organized the same way. While the CIO role has made its way to the senior executive suite in some companies (Intel Corp. and McAfee to name two), that is by no means the norm. The CSO role is likewise lagging. Both tend to be lodged at the second tier of executives in many companies. And while it is not universal, the CISO tends to work for the CIO.

The Story

All of this history is essential background to the key messages in Baich’s book Winning as a CISO. He published it in 2005 and was quite rightly taking a look at where the CISO role was heading next. He organized the book as a fictional story about an established company in which the CEO had decided to hire his first CISO. His executive leadership team – the CIO, the general counsel, and the chief operating officer (COO) – had to decide what the new CISO’s responsibilities were and where this individual would fit in the organizational structure. Once the CEO made those decisions, the newly hired CISO had to decide how to execute this new role.

The Tech

The book is a quick read, with only 115 pages including the end credits, but it is a primer on what a CISO should do for any organization. In essence, any organization could use Baich’s book as a basic job description for a new CISO hire.

What Are a CISO’s Responsibilities?

When the story’s CEO brought his executive staff together to discuss the new position, he had them develop a list of responsibilities for the new hire. Here is the list:

  • Security Architecture
  • Incident Response
  • Security Awareness
  • Identity Management
  • Security Policy Development and Compliance
  • Due Diligence for Acquisitions and Mergers
  • Risk Management

I think this is a pretty good list of high-level responsibilities. Anything that comes up later that we might want the CISO to do can be easily shoehorned into one of these broad categories. Once the staff agreed to the responsibilities, the next step was to determine which senior executive should own them. In other words, which senior executive should the CISO work for?

To Whom Does the CISO Report?

All of the senior staff members had their perspectives. The CIO said, “The CISO should report to the IT Department because the focus of information security is related to technology. Information security solves technology related risks.” The general counsel said, “The CISO should report through the legal structure. [The] focus can be placed on compliance.” The COO said, “The CISO will have to collaborate with all departments, and everyone, including the sales team will benefit, but the team member who will need to utilize the resulting information the most will be the COO. A clear understanding of the operational risk factors will enable the successful CISO to present to the COO with a rubric of important options.”

The CEO weighed each of these perspectives and had a few of his own. He said that he did not want the new CISO to have to wrestle with any artificial organizational conflicts because he chose to put the position under one senior executive as opposed to another. He said that putting the CISO under the CIO had a number of problems, but the most important one was that it created a conflict of interest. “Reporting to the CIO would be like putting your boss on report.” The CISO’s job is to make things more secure, and sometimes that job may be in direct conflict with the CIO’s job of making things more efficient. With the CISO under the CIO, the organization automatically weights efficiency needs over security needs, and that obviates the reason to hire the CISO in the first place.

An opposing view comes from Forbes reporter Howard Baldwin. Baldwin complained in March 2014 that he did not like recent changes he was seeing within organizations that had broken out the security function to be a peer to the CIO. He says that these CIOs are highly paid executives who can handle competing priorities. In other words, the CIO can handle making decisions between security and efficiency. In other words, that is what we pay a person in this position to do.

But that is not the point. In an interview by Jack Rosenberger, Eric Cole — founder and chief scientist at Secure Anchor Consulting — speculated on one of the reasons that may have contributed to the Target breach in 2014. Cole said, “It is almost a guarantee that Target had an amazing security team, and they were screaming and yelling about all of the security issues, but there was no advocate who was listening to them and fighting for their cause with the executives.”

Cole is pointing out that of the priorities the Target CIO had to juggle, security lost out. As Brian Krebs reported in the Guardian, “Virtually all aspects of retail operations are connected to the Internet these days: when the security breaks down, the technology breaks down – and if the technology breaks down, the business grinds to a halt.” Before the breach, the pressure to keep the IT infrastructure up and running must have been immense for both the now-resigned CIO and the now-fired CEO. Krebs suggests that in hindsight, because of the breach’s devastating impact to the business, the Target CISO should not have worked for the CIO. It should have been the other way around.

In Baich’s story, the CEO had reservations about putting the CISO under other staff organizations too. He said that putting the CISO under the general counsel “would potentially position the Information Security department as an arm of the audit department.” According to Baich, auditing support is something the new CISO should help with, but based on the responsibilities the executive staff developed, the CISO’s role is much bigger.

The CEO ultimately put the CISO under the COO. To him, it made sense that the CISO position be perfectly positioned to support the entire organization and not one specific staff element. I think this makes sense. If loss associated with security is something that will potentially materially affect the business, it makes total sense to raise the platform of the person in charge of it to have a view of the entire organization and the power to affect change. If that is the case, then what skill sets are needed for the person who takes on that responsibility?

What Skill Sets Does a CISO Need?

Once he decided whom the CISO should work for, the CEO turned again to his senior staff to determine what skill sets would be essential for success. Without fanfare, Baich lists these five attributes:

  • Must have an MBA
  • Prior budget or P&L experience
  • A proven ability to lead an effective information security organization
  • Experience and skill as a change agent
  • Ability to serve as an information security expert for the executive team

The last three skills are fairly standard for many senior job positions in any organization. The first two are where Baich is providing some innovative thinking. Requiring an MBA and P&L experience for a CISO, as a mandatory requirement, is not the common thinking in the industry, but it is spot on for where the industry needs to go. As I said earlier, most CISOs have come up through the technical ranks and have little if any business experience. This is probably the main reason that security teams and business teams have a hard time communicating with each other. By requiring a CISO to have business experience first, Baich flips the typical experience equation on its head. Instead of training highly technical employees to be proficient in business concerns at the mid- to latter parts of their careers, he is suggesting that we take traditional business people and train them to be proficient in managing security operations.

“If performing vulnerability assessments, configuring firewalls, and performing network forensics makes you happy then becoming Chief Information Security Officer may not be the right career choice for you.”

Just like a traditional business person might find himself or herself as a general manager, product manager, finance officer, or marketing officer, Baich is suggesting we add security officer to the list, and I agree with him.

How Do You Be a CISO?

In Baich’s story, the CEO placed the CISO under the COO in order to give the position a matrixed view of the business. In that kind of environment, how does a CISO succeed? In spite of all the listed responsibilities this CISO has for the organization, Baich says that the most important implied responsibility for the CISO is running his or her organization like a business. The CISO needs to become the general manager of the security program.

“Ultimately, the success of any business, new or old, depends on a leader’s ability to build a team, market and sell the product, and run the business, still meeting the established measurements necessary to effectively operate the business.”

Although the CISO in this story will bring in no revenue, this individual has to demonstrate to the business leadership the value of the position in other ways. The CISO must become a world-class internal marketing person for every aspect of the security program. It is not enough to make the organization more secure. The CISO’s efforts to do so must demonstrably show how the security program is helping the organization grow.

Conclusion

Baich is an innovative thinker. He has looked at how the CISO role has evolved over the years and makes a pretty good case for where it needs to go next. By asking questions about the appropriate supervisor for a CISO, a CISO’s needed skill set, and ways to approach the CISO job function, Baich breaks new ground on how to think about these topics. Baich published the book in 2005. Back then, there was not a lot of impetus to change the current situation, and I do not see the industry adopting these ideas any time soon. But with the rash of highly publicized and impactful data breaches to the retail sector in 2014, perhaps the industry is ready to make a change. It is obvious that the way we are doing it now is not working. Because of Baich’s innovative thinking about the next step in the evolution of the CISO role, Winning as a CISO is Cybersecurity Canon-worthy, and you should have read it by now.

[Palo Alto Networks Blog]

Cybersecurity Canon: Your Vote Counts

The Cybersecurity Canon is official, and you can see our website here. We modeled it after the Baseball or Rock & Roll Hall-of-Fame, except for cybersecurity books. We have 25 books on the candidate list and we are soliciting help from the cybersecurity community to increase the number to be much more than that. Please write a review and nominate your favorite – we’re actively soliciting your feedback!

Coming soon: You will get the chance to vote on which books you want to see join Parmy Olson’s We Are Anonymous in the Cybersecurity Canon.

Public Internet voting opens on February 1, so watch this space to find out how to vote for your favorite cybersecurity book. Winners will be inducted into the Canon at the Awards Ceremony during the Ignite Conference in Las Vegas on April 1, 2015.

Don’t see your favorite cybersecurity book on the candidate list? You should submit it for consideration.

[Palo Alto Networks Blog]

What’s Your Favorite Cybersecurity Book? Maybe It Should Be In the Canon

The Cybersecurity Canon is official, and you can see our website here. We modeled it after the Baseball or Rock & Roll Hall-of-Fame, except for cybersecurity books. We have 20 books on the initial candidate list but we are soliciting help from the cybersecurity community to increase the number to be much more than that. Please write a review and nominate your favorite – we’re actively soliciting your feedback!

The Cybersecurity Canon is a real thing for our community. We have designed it so that you can directly participate in the process. Please do so!

The members of our Cybersecurity Canon committee have been submitting reviews of Canon-worthy books throughout the past year. Here are just some of the titles that have entered the discussion since we began publishing reviews in November 2013:

 

We will celebrate the Cybersecurity Canon and make a new induction at Ignite 2015. Register now to join us March 30-April 1, 2015 in Las Vegas.

[Palo Alto Networks Blog]

The Cybersecurity Canon: Where Wizards Stay Up Late

The Cybersecurity Canon is official, and you can now see our website here. We modeled it after the Baseball or Rock & Roll Hall-of-Fame, except for cybersecurity books. We have 20 books on the initial candidate list but we are soliciting help from the cybersecurity community to increase the number to be much more than that. Please write a review and nominate your favorite. 

The Cybersecurity Canon is a real thing for our community. We have designed it so that you can directly participate in the process. Please do so!

Book Review:  Where Wizards Stay Up Late: The Origins of The Internet (1996) by Katie Hafner

This review was written by Bob Clark, a member of the Cybersecurity Canon committee. Bob is a cyber operational lawyer for the Army Cyber Institute, United States Military Academy in West Point, New York, taking over these duties from his position as Distinguished Professor of Law (Cyber) at the Naval Academy. A career military officer and attorney, he has over 20 years of experience within the Department of Defense, having served as its counterdrug command as well as numerous other challenging positions. Read Bob’s full bio, and those of our other Committee members, on the Cybersecurity Canon home page here.

Executive Summary

This book chronicles the true early beginnings of the Internet and the many hard-working engineers and computer scientists along the way that designed and built it from the ground up. Cybersecurity practitioners across the spectrum today, from policy wonks all the way over to the deep-level geek malware researchers, will get a kick out of learning about the eccentric personalities of the people that built the Internet and their robust designs that provided a catalyst to the greatest economic and social change engine ever invented. For the youngsters out there, this is a history lesson. Be quiet and take your medicine. You need to know this. Trust us. For the old timers, you have heard most of this stuff before in drips and drabs. Wizards will put it altogether for you. You should have read this by now.

Introduction

I am not a techie. I believe it is “chic to be geek” but I am not a full-fledged geek. There are a few things you must realize. First, I am under “orders” to write this review. OK, so maybe not technically under “orders” to write this. But as a member of the Cybersecurity Canon Committee and the only lawyer in the group, I am the committee member most likely to write a review for books that fall into the non-technical category such as history where Wizards firmly settles. Next, I am part-geek, but still being only part geek I wanted to reference and use many other reviewers’ comments in order to insure a fair review of this material.

In Where Wizards Stay Up Late the Amazon.com reviewers overall rated it a 4.5 out of 5 stars with 61 out of 96 giving it the top marks of 5 stars.  And, to summarize many of those reviews, this is a good book if you are in the field or thinking about studying the subject. If not, then as one reviewer said, it may feel more like you are reading a textbook instead of being drawn into a page turning read. Cybersecurity Canon candidate books are supposed to be essential to the cybersecurity practitioner. I would classify how the Internet got started as being related to our field.  With that said, the origins of the Internet are extremely complex with “many fathers,” as Hafner puts it. Explaining this complexity requires an intelligible history that connects the technology story to the people that invented the technology.

The Story

After the launch of Sputnik President Eisenhower’s (already developed) passion for “his scientists” increased.  When he was told, “all scientists are Democrats” he replied, “I don’t believe it, but anyway, I like scientists for their science and not their politics.”

On January 7, 1958, Eisenhower sent a message to Congress requesting startup funds for the establishment of the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) recognizing, as Hafner explains, “the need for single control in some of our most advanced development projects.” Things looked rosy for the new agency: grandiose budgets, plans developed and flourished, right up until a little agency called NASA showed up, enacted under law, and gutted ARPA’s budget and programs.

Hafner writes, “Aviation Week called the young agency a dead cat hanging in the fruit closet.” So the staff of ARPA decided to tap into university research projects and focus on the “far-out” research. The universities responded sensing that dollars would flow their way to conduct “high-risk, high-gain” research. But what fell into ARPA’s lap, and more importantly its funding, was the upkeep of an Air Force computer, the Q-32.

It was recognized that, as Hafner explains, “computers, as they related to command and control, might one day provide high-speed, reliable information upon which to base critical military decisions. That potential, largely unfilled, seemed endlessly promising.” That identification of a government mission that no one else was doing sent ARPA on its way to develop not only computers and networks for the underlying funding requirements of a network for military command and control, but as scientists and university researchers, to develop the open and collaborative research networks for their peers.

As the review from Publishers Weekly points out,

While the book attempts to debunk the conventional notion that ARPANET was devised primarily as a communications link that could survive nuclear war (essentially it was not), pioneer developers like Paul Baran (who, along, with British Scientist Donald Davies devised the Internet’s innovative packet-switching message technology) recognized the importance of an indestructible message medium in an age edgy over the prospects of global nuclear destruction.

About the People

The story follows those pioneers from ARPA and the engineering firm of Bolt, Beranek and Newman, as well as dozens others that combined hardware and software to establish the ARPAnet and send us on our way to the Internet. With so many “Internet fathers,” how can a review capture them all?  The book does a great job recognizing many of those that were behind this adventure. And like our founding fathers, what is amazing is their age and their unique opportunity to be “engineering pioneers and discoverers.”

The idea of graduate students or young “new” engineers working on this equipment with their unsupervised responsibilities seems totally unimaginable, particularly in today’s age of established firms with government contracts and oversight. Wizards does a good job explaining their contributions and admirably lends a little context to their personalities, their drive, and their ability (or lack thereof) to be a team player.

About the Tech

So you want to learn about this technology in this period?  This is the book for you! The description of the hardware and software development is well done and detailed.  I know more about IMPs now than I probably ever really wanted to and I think this is where the book makes its mark.  If you are in this business and want to dive into the technological development of the ARPAnet and its protocols, without pulling out the IEEE white papers or RFCs, this is for you.

Conclusion

This is a worthy book for inclusion in the Cybersecurity Canon nomination list for both the techies in the community and the non-techies. For the non-techies in the crowd  — policy-wonks, lawyers, etc. – Wizards will help you understand enough about the technology that will enable you to converse with techies at some level.

While I agree with other reviewers I’ve seen who say they wish it read better as a story, Wizardsdoes provide a great understanding of the technology and gives you a feel for the pioneers that made it happen.  And there is no better way to find acceptance into a community that will shun you without the appropriate bona fides (either through education or work experience) then to learn to speak the technology and know the names and backgrounds of the pioneers and giants in this field.  This book will definitely give you that information.  For the techies in the group, you are going to get a birds-eye view of how the engineers conceived and implemented the beginnings of the Internet.

References

Hafner, Katie, “Where Wizards Stay Up Late” of Simon & Schuster, iBooks. Published by Touchstone, Rockefeller Center, 1230 Avenue of the Americas, New York, NY 10020.  Copyright © 1996 by Katie Hafner and Matthew Lyon.

[Palo Alto Networks Blog]

The Cybersecurity Canon: Read Rick Howard’s First-Look Review of SPAM Nation by Brian Krebs

The Cybersecurity Canon is official, and you can now see our website here. We modeled it after the Baseball or Rock & Roll Hall-of-Fame, except for cybersecurity books. We have 20 books on the initial candidate list but we are soliciting help from the cybersecurity community to increase the number to be much more than that. Please write a review and nominate your favorite. 

The Cybersecurity Canon is a real thing for our community. We have designed it so that you can directly participate in the process. Please do so!

 

Book Review: Spam Nation: The Inside Story of Organized Cybercrime from Global Epidemic to Your Front Door (2014) by Brian Krebs

Executive Summary

In Spam Nation, Brian Krebs covers a key portion of our cybersecurity and cyber crime history: 2007–2013, that period when we started to learn about the Russian Business Network, bulletproof-hosting providers, fast-flux obfuscation, criminal best business practices, underground cyber crime forums, and strange-sounding botnet names like Conficker, Rustock, Storm, and Waledac.

This period just happens to coincide with Krebs’s rise in popularity as one of the leading cybersecurity journalists in the industry. His relationship with two competitive pharmaceutical spammers—Pavel Vrublevsky and Dimitry Nechvolod—is a big bag of crazy and is the key storyline throughout the book. The competition between Vrublevsky and Nechvolod escalated into something that Krebs calls the Pharma Wars and Krebs gives us a bird’s-eye view into the details of that escalation that eventually destroyed both men and the industry they helped to create. Krebs’s weird symbiotic relationship with Vrublevsky is worth the read by itself. Spam Nation is definitely a Cybersecurity Canon candidate. It’s just out today, so I won’t say you should have read this by now – but get on it as soon as you can.

Introduction

I have been a fan of Brian Krebs for many years. His blog, Krebs on Security, has been a mainstay of my reading list since he started it in 2010, and even before when he was writing forThe Washington Post. Since he struck out on his own, he has carved out a new kind of journalism that many reporters are watching to see how they might duplicate it themselves as journalism transitions from dead-tree printing to new media, and the idea that the author is the brand. Krebs’s beat is cybersecurity, and he is the leading journalistic authority on the underbelly of cyber crime. Spam Nation is a retelling — with more detail and more color — of some of the stories he covered from 2007 until about 2013 on a very specific sub-element of the cyber crime industry called pharmaceutical spam.

Many security practitioners will hear the phrase “pharmaceutical spam” and immediately start to nod off. Of all the problems they encounter on a daily basis, pharmaceutical spam is pretty low on the priority list. While that may be true, this subset of cyber crime is responsible for starting and maturing many of the trappings that we associate with cyber crime in general: botnet engines, fast-flux obfuscation, spamming, underground forums, cyber crime markets, good service as a distinguisher of criminal support services, and bulletproof-hosting providers.

The Story

The story really begins with Krebs’s weird symbiotic relationship with Vrublevsky (a.k.a. RedEye and Despduck). Vrublevsky was a Russian businessman, and cofounder and former CEO of ChronoPay, the infamous credit card processing company that initially got started in the rogue anti-virus industry. I think it is safe to say that in his heyday, Vrublevsky was a bit of an extrovert. He followed Krebs’s blog religiously and would instigate long conversations with Krebs on stories that were fantastical, true, and everything in between. Vrublevsky would feed Krebs half-truths about what was going on in the industry and left it to Krebs to sort it out. Vrublevsky’s downfall was his deteriorating relationship with his former partner, Dimitry Nechvolod (a.k.a. Gugle).

Vrublevsky and Nechvolod founded ChronoPay together in 2003, but by 2006, Nechvolod had left the company to pursue his own interests. He started two pharmacy spam operations called GlavMed and SpamIT. Because of the competition between these two men, the situation escalated out of control, to something that Krebs calls the Pharma Wars, which ultimately scuttled the entire pharmaceutical spam industry, not just Vrublevsky and Nechvolod’s operations, but everybody else’s, too.

Krebs’s main sources of information for this book came from leaked customer and operational databases from these two men. Although Vrublevsky and Nechvolod never admitted it, they both stole the other’s data and leaked it to Krebs. Krebs had many conversations with both Vrublevsky and Nechvolod about their side of the story, and Krebs even traveled to Moscow to interview Vrublevsky personally. From these conversations and other research done by Krebs, we get an inside view of how cyber crime operates in the real world.

Krebs set himself seven research questions:

  • Who is buying the stuff advertised in spam and why?
  • Are the drugs real or fake?
  • Who profits?
  • Why does the legitimate pharmaceutical industry seem powerless to stop it?
  • Why is it easy to pay for the drugs with credit cards?
  • Do customers have their credit card accounts hacked after buying?
  • What can consumers, policy makers, and law enforcement do [about this cybercrime]?

For the most part, he answers all these questions in the book. I will not spill the answers here, but I will tell you that I was surprised by every single one. I thought I knew this stuff, but Krebs provides the insight and research to make you re-evaluate what you think you know about illegal pharmaceutical spam operations.

Spam Nation is about the Brian Krebs story, too. Traditional journalists reading this book are going to hate the fact the he plays a key role in most everything that he talks about in this book, but it seems inevitable given that Krebs is himself a journalistic brand now. His original reporting on bulletproof-hosting providers operating in the US and elsewhere — the Russian Business Network (RBN), Atrivo, and McColo — became that catalyst that eventually got them shut down. This got him noticed by Vrublevsky and started that weird relationship that ultimately led to Krebs receiving the databases from Vrublevsky and Nechvolod. It also led him to leave The Washington Post and to start Krebs on Security.

In the background, Krebs introduces us to the key players involved in the development and operations of some of the most infamous botnets that have hit the Internet community in recent history:

  • Conficker worm (author: Severa; infected 9-15 million computers)
  • Cutwail botnet (authors: Dimitry Nechvolod (Gugle) and Igor Vishnevsky; 125,000 infected computers; spewed 16 billion spam messages a day)
  • Grum botnet (author: GeRA; spewed 18 billion e-mails a day)
  • Festi botnet (operators: Artimovich brothers; delivered one-third of the total amount of worldwide spam)
  • Rustock botnet (author: COSMA; infected 150,000 PCs; spewed 30 billion spam messages a day)
  • Storm botnet (author: Severa).
  • Waledac botnet (author: Severa; spewed 1.5 billion junk e-mails a day)

From my reading, Krebs’s unintentional hero of his story is Microsoft. While Vrublevsky and Nechvolod were tearing each other apart and Krebs was trying to sift through what was true and what was not, Microsoft and other commercial, academic, and government organizations were quietly dismantling the infrastructure that these and other illicit operations depended on:

  • June 2009: 15,000 illicit websites go dark at 3FN after the Federal Trade Commission convinced a northern California judge that 3FN was a black-hat service provider. NASA did the forensics work.
  • November 2009: FireEye takes down the Mega-D botnet.
  • January 2010: Neustar takes control of the Lethic spam botnet.
  • March 2010: Microsoft takes down the Waledac botnet.
  • October 2010: Armenian authorities take down the Bredolab botnet.
  • March 2011: Microsoft takes down the Rustock botnet.
  • July 2011: Microsoft offers a $250,000 reward for information leading to the arrest and conviction of the Rustock botmaster.
  • July 2012: FireEye and Spamhaus take down the Grum botnet.
  • July 2013: Microsoft and the FBI take down 1,400 botnets using the Citadel malware to control infected PCs.
  • December 2013: Microsoft and the FBI take down the ZeroAccess botnet.
  • June 2014: The FBI takes down of the Gameover Zeus botnet.

One takedown masterstroke came out of academia. George Mason University, the International Computer Science Institute, the University of California, San Diego, and Microsoft determined that 95 percent of all spam credit card processing was handled by three financial firms: one in Azerbaijan, one in Denmark, and one in Nevis (West Indies). They also pointed out that these financial firms were in violation of Visa’s own Global Brand Protection Program contract that required fines of $25,000 for transactions supporting the sale of Viagra, Cialis, and Levitra. Once Visa started levying fines, the financial firms stopped processing the transactions. The beauty of this takedown was that this was not a legal maneuver through the courts and law enforcement. It merely encouraged Visa to follow its own policy.

Cyber Crime Business Operations

For me, one of the most enjoyable parts of Spam Nation is the insight on how these criminal organizations operate. For example, Krebs highlights why pharmaceutical operations have great customer support: they want to avoid the penalty fees associated with a transaction when a buyer of illicit pills charges them with fraud. These are called chargebacks, and pharmaceutical customer support operations avoid them like the plague. These support operations require teams of software developers and technical support staff to be available 24/7.

Pharmaceutical operations have mature anti-fraud measures — equivalent to any legitimate bank’s anti-fraud measures — because they need to keep law enforcement and security researchers out of their business.

Most spammers do not make a lot of money. The top five do, but not everybody else. Krebs points out that it takes a multibillion-dollar security industry to defend against a collection of criminals who do this to make a living wage.

In terms of botnet management, operators rent out top-earning botnets to other operators who do not have the skill to build a botnet themselves. Renters purchase installs and seed a prearranged number of bots with an additional malicious program that sends spam for the affiliate. They pay the rent by diverting a portion of their commissions on each pill sale from spam. Sometimes, that commission is as high as 50 percent. That is why the small-timers do not make any money.

Operators launder their money in a process called factoring. They map their client transactions into accounts on behalf of previously established shell companies. They tell the banks that the shell companies are the true customers. Then the operators pay the clients out of their own pockets.

Russian law allows FSB agents (Federal Security Service, the successor to the Soviet Union’s KGB), while remaining in the service, to be assigned to work at enterprises and organizations at the consent of their directors. Twenty percent of FSB officers are engaged in this protection business called “Krusha” in Russian, which means “roof” and pharmaceutical spam operations use them as much as possible.

Partnerships, called partnerkas, between spammers and dodgy advertisers that act as an intermediary for potential sponsors are essential. In this way, sponsors keep their distance from the illicit aspects of the spam business and can unplug from one partnerka in favor of another whenever they want. Some refer to this as organized crime (think The Godfather), but it is more like a loosely affiliated network of independent operators.

With all of these best business practices, you can see why the operators do not see themselves as criminals. They are just businesspeople trying to run a business.

The Tech

Cyber crime runs on technology. In the pharmaceutical spam business, some tech is unique, and other tech is shared with other kinds of cyber crime operations. Unique to pharmaceutical spam is a technique called black search engine optimization (Black SEO). Pharmaceutical spammers hack legitimate websites and insert hidden pages (IFrames) with loads of pharmaceutical websites links. The more links that the common search engines like Google and Bing index, the higher the pharmaceutical sites get in the priority list when normal users search for pills online.

Also unique to the pharmaceutical spam business is a good spam ecosystem. It must have the ability to keep track of how many e-mails the system delivered and how many recipients clicked the link. It must scrub e-mail addresses that are no longer active or are obvious decoys and harvest new e-mail addresses for future operations.

Not unique to pharmaceutical spam are the forums. Forums are the glue that allows the loosely affiliated network of independent operators to communicate with each other. Forums are a place that allows newbies an opportunity to establish a reputation and lowers the barriers to entry for a life of cyber crime. There are forums for every language, but most are in English. Members enforce a strict code of ethics so that members who are caught cheating other members are quickly banned. Social networking rankings give members a way to evaluate potential partners. A single negative post may cost an individual thousands of dollars. Because of that, most amicably resolve issues. Sometimes newbies get labeled as a “deer,” or members who unintentionally break one of the forum’s rules. More serious infractions might find a member in the blacklist subforum defending himself or herself from fraud allegations.

New forums start all the time, but some have been in existence for more than a decade, indicating process maturity for self-policing, networking, and rapid information sharing. New forums allow open registration, but mature forums set up various hurdles for membership that are designed to screen out law enforcement and hangers-on. Most have sub-rooms for specialization such as the following:

  • Spam
  • Cyber banking fraud
  • Bank account cash-out schemes
  • Malicious software development
  • ID theft
  • Credit card fraud
  • Confidence scams
  • Black SEO

Forums have many members (tens of thousands in some), but they exist to make money for the administrators. Admins offer additional services to improve the user experience. They offer escrow services — a small percentage of the transaction cost held until both sides agree that the other held up its end of the bargain — and stickies — ads that stay at the top of their sub-forums that range in price from $100 to $1,000 per month.

Conclusion

In Spam Nation, Brian Krebs covers a key portion of our cyber security and cyber crime history: 2007– 2013, that period when we started to learn about the Russian Business Network, bulletproof-hosting providers, fast-flux obfuscation, criminal best business practices, underground cyber crime forums, and strange-sounding botnet names like Conficker, Cutwail, Grum, Festi, Rustock, Storm, and Waledac. This period just happens to coincide with Krebs’s rise in popularity as one of the leading cybersecurity journalists in the industry. His story, and the story of two competitive pharmaceutical spammers who eventually destroyed the lucrative moneymaking scheme for all players, is a fascinating read. It is definitely a Cybersecurity Canon candidate.

[Palo Alto Networks Blog]

English
Exit mobile version