Cyber threats to Windows XP and guidance for Small Businesses and Individual Consumers

It’s been well publicized that on April 8th, 2014 Microsoft discontinues product support for Windows XP.  Released in 2001, the support policy for the life of Windows XP soon followed in October 2002.  In September 2007, we announced that support for Windows XP would be extended an additional two years to April 8 2014.  We are very clear about the lifecycle of our products, deliberately communicating this information years in advance, because we know customers need time to plan for changes to their technology investments and manage upgrades to newer systems and services.

We’ve also focused on communicating regularly, such as an article posted in August of last year.  That piece focused on the fact that supported versions get security updates that address any newly discovered vulnerabilities, which Windows XP won’t receive after April 8, 2014.  This means that running Windows XP when the product is obsolete (after support ends), will increase the risk of technology being affected by cybercriminals attempting to do harm.  This blog post continues on from that article, and also provides guidance to consider as people look ahead.

Many of the enterprise customers I’ve talked to recently have finished, or are in the process of finishing, technology projects that move their desktop computing environments from Windows XP to Windows 7 or Windows 8.  However, I’ve also talked to some small businesses and individuals that don’t plan to replace their Windows XP systems even after support for these systems ends in April.  In light of this, I want to share some of the specific threats to Windows XP-based systems that attackers may attempt after support ends, so that these customers can understand the risks and hopefully decide to immediately upgrade to a more secure version of Windows, or accelerate existing plans to do so.

The cyber threats discussed here are based on data and insights from recent volumes of theMicrosoft Security Intelligence Report.  This report includes aggregate data on the threats that hundreds of millions of systems around the world encounter – many of which are successfully blocked by Microsoft antivirus software and the security features built into Windows, Internet Explorer, Bing, and other Microsoft products and services. This data gives us a good picture of the tactics that attackers have been using to try to compromise computer systems, including which attacks are used most often on Windows XP systems.  The information then helps Microsoft and antivirus security companies develop ways to combat those attacks.  From the year that Windows XP was built, cyber attacks have increased in sophistication.  Systems receiving regular updates get the protections they need based on the latest cyber threats.  But at some point an older model of any product will lack the capability to keep up and becomes antiquated.  Obsolescence for Windows XP is just around the corner.

What Motivates Cyber Attackers?
Attackers’ motivations have changed over the past decade.  Ten years ago attackers were primarily motivated by making a name for themselves through notoriety for each malicious act they completed.  Today, attackers typically steal personal and business information from the systems they go after and try to keep a lower profile, as the goal is financial profit more regularly than mischievous disruption or ego.  The attackers that steal the information from computer systems sometimes choose to trade or sell that stolen information to other criminals to use for identity theft and bank fraud schemes.  And, access to compromised computer systems is often sold or leased by attackers to other criminals to perpetrate more crimes against additional unsuspecting victims, while providing anonymity to the original criminals.

Microsoft Security Innovations made it Harder for Cyber Attackers to be Successful
Following Windows XP’s release and through 2004, there were several cyber attacks that gained widespread awareness in news outlets and with many customers.  In the wake of those computer virus attacks, Microsoft invested further in several important security protections and turned existing improvements (called “mitigations” by security experts) in order to better protect customers that were running Windows XP.  This protection push resulted in a major update called Windows XP Service Pack 2, which was released in 2004.  One of the security mitigations that was turned on in Service Pack 2 was a feature called Windows Firewall. This helped stop many of the attacks that were common at that time and made it much harder for attackers to violate Windows XP systems.  Our security intelligence report shows that the time between major attacks extended in length after Windows XP Service Pack 2 was released, proving that Service Pack 2 provided more protections than prior versions of Windows XP.

The Usual Suspects – Threats to expect against Windows XP
The types of attacks that we expect to target Windows XP systems after April 8th, 2014 will likely reflect the motivations of modern day attackers.  Cybercriminals will work to take advantage of businesses and people running software that no longer has updates available to repair issues.  Over time, attackers will evolve their malicious software, malicious websites, and phishing attacks to take advantage of any  newly discovered vulnerabilities in Windows XP, which post April 8th, will no longer be fixed.

Here’s a list of risks that Windows XP based systems might encounter over time, along with some guidance to help small businesses and individual consumers temporarily protect themselves against cyber attacks while moving to a modern operating system:

RISK #1: SURFING THE INTERNET:  New exploits for Windows XP will likely be added to cybersecurity exploit kits that are sold/leased to attackers.  Exploit kits make it easy for professional and novice attackers alike to build malicious websites that try to install malware on systems that visit those sites.  Surfing the Internet on Windows XP based systems after April 8th, 2014 will become more risky as new exploits for Windows XP are distributed among attackers via exploit kits.

Guidance: Since browsing the Internet is a risky proposition if running on out-of- support systems like Windows XP after April, small businesses and consumers should limit where they go to on the Internet to help manage the risk.  Limiting the specific websites these systems can get to on the Internet, or simply not using Windows XP systems to connect to the Internet, will reduce the probability of compromise via a malicious website.

Important note: Changing browsers won’t mitigate this risk as most of the exploits used in such attacks aren’t related to browsers.

RISK #2: OPENING EMAIL AND USING INSTANT MESSAGING (IM): Many attacks typically start with a well-constructed phishing attack via email.  The email will likely contain the Internet address (also known as a URL) to a malicious website that has been constructed for unsupported Windows XP based systems.  The email could also have a specially crafted malicious attachment that when opened, exploits an unpatched Windows XP vulnerability, potentially giving attackers control of the system.  Attackers have also used Instant Messaging (IM) to deliver malicious URLs and attachments.  Opening email or using IM on Windows XP based systems after April 8th, 2014 will become more risky as new exploits for Windows XP may be integrated into phishing attacks, malicious emails and IMs.

Guidance: Malicious e-mail messages are a very common tactic attackers use to gain entry to systems.  Given this, it would be prudent to avoid using Windows XP systems to send or receive email.  Avoid clicking on links or opening attachments sent via email or IM.

Important note:Using a different email or IM program likely won’t mitigate this risk as these attacks are typically in the content of the messages themselves, not a vulnerability in a specific email or IM program.

RISK #3: USING REMOVABLE DRIVES:  Attackers can attempt to use USB drives and other types of removable drives to distribute malware that seeks to leverage new vulnerabilities in Windows XP to compromise systems.

Guidance: This is a common way that Windows XP systems get infected with malware.  Some customers have decided to physically block access to USB ports on systems in their organizations in an attempt to block this type of threat.  Connecting removable storage devices to Windows XP systems should be avoided. More information is available in this article: Defending Against Autorun Attacks.

RISK #4: WORMS WILL USE ANY NEWLY DISCOVERED VULNERABILITIES TO ATTACK WINDOWS XP: Malware purveyors will likely integrate new vulnerabilities targeting Windows XP, into malware that tries to multiply.  The success of the virus named Conficker, to infect systems in enterprise environments, illustrates that security firewalls and strong password policies are still not comprehensively used.  Organizations that continue to run Windows XP after support ends, should be on guard for this type of threat in their environment, which is typically introduced into systems by infected USB drives in an attempt to get past firewalls.

Guidance: Review any exceptions you allow, through firewalls, in your environment. Only keep the exceptions in your firewall rules that you really need.  Follow the earlier guidance to limit removable drive use on Windows XP systems. Use strong passwords on your systems that can’t be easily guessed.

RISK #5: RANSOMWARE:  We have seen a large uptick in ransomware in recent years.  Attackers use this type of malware to extort users into paying them to unencrypt files that the malware has encrypted on their system, or to unlock the system’s desktop.  After April 2014, attackers will likely attempt to use unpatched vulnerabilities on Windows XP based systems to distribute ransomware.  This type of attack can have a crippling impact on small businesses and consumers that lose access to important data or systems.

Guidance: Restoring data from backup is a good way to recover from a ransomware infection.  More frequent backups of data stored on Windows XP systems or that Windows XP systems have access to, would be prudent after April.

So What Should You Do?

The guidance above provides suggestions towards managing some of the risks of running Windows XP post April 8.  However, the primary thrust of our advice is clear: the best option is to migrate to a modern operating system like Windows 7 or Windows 8 that have a decade of evolved security mitigations built in and will be supported after April 8, 2014.

Upgrade Advice
For customers considering upgrading a device designed to run Windows XP, we recommend purchasing modern hardware – from touch laptops to tablets to all-in-ones – to take full advantage of the features and touch-based user interface available in Windows 8 or later systems.  Modern devices are not only faster and have greater performance than devices running older operating systems, but come with greater security features, new and improved networking tools for when you’re on the go, modern apps and more.

If a customer wants to upgrade an existing machine to Windows 8.1, upgrade activities depend on what current operating system is on the machine, and the capabilities of that hardware.  System requirements to install a new operating system can be found here.

  • Computers running Windows 8 can be updated to Windows 8.1 via the Windows Store (for consumers) or using media (for larger organizations with volume licensing).
  • Computers running Windows 7 can be upgraded to Windows 8 using media, then updated to Windows 8.1 (using the process above).
  • Computers running Windows XP cannot be upgraded in-place to Windows 7, Windows 8, or Windows 8.1. A clean install is necessary, although user data can be migrated.

For customers who are unsure of what version of Windows they are using, visitAmIRunningXP.com, a website designed to automatically tell if a computer is running on Windows XP or a newer version of Windows like Windows 7, Windows 8 or Windows 8.1.  If it detects Windows XP, the website provides guidance on how to upgrade ahead of the April 8th end of support deadline.

Additional information on the end of support for Windows XP and how to upgrade can be foundhere.

Tim Rains
Director
Trustworthy Computing Group

Addressing Cyberattacks via Positive Enforcement Model

Stop Playing Whack-A-Mole with Advanced Threats

As more and more details about the Target breach have emerged, security experts, bloggers and media have focused on on why Target failed to react to alerts from zero day malware point products that allegedly provided indication there was malware in the network.

According to a Bloomberg BusinessWeek article, a team of security specialists in Bangalore, India, spotted the alerts and relayed the information to counterparts at Target’s headquarters in Minneapolis, who apparently failed to follow up. In fact, according to thisNetwork World article, major companies often do not react to these alerts because there receive so many false positives it takes too many resources to act on them.

Whether or not someone should have acted on the information is beside the point. The takeaway from this breach is that the strategy of tackling modern, advanced attacks via point products is flawed. The modern attack cycle, and the cyber criminals behind it are using a sophisticated system to attack enterprises. (Just think about the definition of APTs – advanced, persistent threats). Trying to defend them with one-off point solutions is like playing a whack-a-mole game, always one step behind the attacker and trying to play catch up with the alerts as they’re received. A tactical, negative enforcement approach using point solutions means that organizations are constantly trying to keep up with bad things in the network without proper context.

Jon Oltsik of Enterprise Strategy Group in his report entitled “Advanced Malware Trends, Opinions and Strategies” outlined this very eloquently:

“Following a historical pattern, many organizations want to address new types of malware with new kinds of threat prevention technologies. After all, this strategy worked reasonably well against e-mail threats, web threats, and endpoint threats in the past. Why not just buy another appliance to block new types of malware?

 Unfortunately, this strategy will simply add another one-off solution to an already chaotic security infrastructure. ESG believes that this type of enterprise security infrastructure based upon independent point tools and manual processes will ultimately fail because it is no match for the scale, sophistication, and complexity of modern IT and cyber threats.”

Addressing Cyberattacks via a Positive Enforcement Model

A better philosophy to addressing modern attacks is via a positive enforcement model. Positive enforcement implies that you selectively allow what is required for day-to-day business operations as opposed to a negative enforcement approach where you would selectively block everything that is not allowed.

When adopting a positive enforcement model, you would:

• Only enable applications, their application functions and content for certain groups and users. For example, “John” from “group Finance” can access the PCI zone using “Oracle application. All other traffic is explicitly denied. (Oh, and by the way, if you’re still using security appliances that classify traffic based on ports and protocols, you’re out of luck!).

• Next, for the application traffic that you’ve allowed in your network, you would inspect the applications for known threats, ensuring that common vulnerabilities are not being exploited by attackers.

• Sandboxing technology is then used to inspect unknown files for zero day malware that may have been downloaded by a gullible user in the network, or used to infect servers in the datacenter. Note that the sandboxing technology to inspect for unknown threats becomes the last line of defense, not a reactionary first line of defense.

• Information about zero day malware found via this sandboxing technology should then be used to create threat signatures to ensure no further infection or malware propagation in the network. In addition, information about indicators of compromise, command and control domains, DNS information should be fed into other threat prevention functions (like URL blocking for the new command and control domains), rapidly turning these unknown threats into known threats.

Benefits of a Positive Enforcement Model Approach

There are several benefits to this approach:

Context – Effective security for organizations is about building good context and managing risks. This positive enforcement model can be applied to various segments of the network, providing context and understanding of what is traversing the network. If the proper context is known about a particular segment being protected, any alerts can be acted on with the appropriate urgency.

Reduce attack surface – This positive enforcement approach also reduces the attack surface. By only allowing certain applications and application functions for user groups, any unknown traffic becomes more significant, and can signify hacker or malware activity or an unknown application.

Systems approach to attack lifecycle – the most important aspect of the approach above is transforming information about unknown zero day malware to known information that can be part of the arsenal of protection. Just as cybercriminals are using information found in the network to learn, adapt and refine their malware techniques to get to their target data, a proper systems-based threat prevention solution will continually learn and adapt to new threats.

If you’ve reacted to the latest zero day malware with a point product du jour, it’s time to take a step back and rethink your strategy. Sandboxing should only be one of many components in an integrated positive enforcement model approach to dealing with malware.

Danelle Au manages data center and service provider solutions atPalo Alto Networks. She brings more than 10 years of product and technical marketing experience in the security and networking market. Prior to Palo Alto Networks, Danelle led the product management and strategy efforts at Cisco for the TrustSec network access control solution and ASA 5500 Adaptive Security Appliance platforms. She was also co-­founder of a high-­speed networking chipset startup. She is co-­author of an IP Communications Book, “Cisco IP Communications Express: Operation, Implementation and Design Guide for the Small and Branch Office” and holds 2 U.S. Patents.

[Source: SecurityWeek]

(ISC)² is 25 This Year: So What’s Ahead for the Organization?

W. Hord Tipton

(ISC)² is celebrating its silver anniversary as a global organization educating and certifying information security professionals. What are the key threats and trends driving the profession’s future growth?

The field has changed dramatically since 1989, when the International Information Systems Security Certification Consortium was established as a not-for-profit entity dedicated toeducation. When (ISC)² offered its first CISSP credential training, there were 500 applicants. Today, the organization serves more than 100,000 members in 135 countries, and its education programs are a vital element of a CISO‘s career development.

W. Hord Tipton, executive director of (ISC)², says the organization is at a critical juncture.

“Our technology is just expanding exponentially,” Tipton says in an interview with Information Security Media Group. “We come from an area 25 years ago of really not having cellphones to now having smart computers hanging on our hips with more power than the Apollo [space capsule] that landed on the moon. It’s just amazing the things we have to change to keep up with this evolution.”

For the first half, maybe three-quarters of its existence, (ISC)² was primarily a certifying body, Tipton says. But the organization’s role has evolved dramatically.

“Now, having hit 100,000 members, we’re a self-sustaining operation,” he says. “We’re an organization that doesn’t exist for the mere sake of gaining members any more.”

Instead, Tipton says, “We refer to ourselves as an education and certification organization with social responsibility, as exhibited through our newly founded foundation.

“We try to build the security professionals of the future, and we want to get them early and keep them on a very robust and growing career path.”

In an interview about (ISC)² and its 25th anniversary, Tipton discusses:

  • Major accomplishments of the organization’s first 25 years;
  • The state of the security profession today;
  • Threats and trends that will drive future growth.

(ISC)² is a global leader in educating and certifying information security professionals throughout their careers. Before leading (ISC)², Tipton served as president and CEO of Ironman Technologies, where his clients included IBM, Perot Systems, EDS, Booz Allen Hamilton and Symantec. He also served for five years as CIO for the U.S. Department of the Interior.

[Source: Careers Info Security]

The Cybersecurity Canon: The Girl with the Dragon Tattoo

 

For the past decade, I have had this notion that there must be a Cybersecurity Canon: a list of must-read books where the content is timeless, genuinely represents an aspect of the community that is true and precise and that, if not read, leaves a hole in a cybersecurity professional’s education.

presented on this topic at RSA Conference 2014 and will also be discussing it at Ignite 2014. I love a good argument, so feel free to let me know what you think.

The Girl with the Dragon Tattoo (2005) by Stieg Larsson

When I read The Girl with the Dragon Tattoo for the first time a few years ago, I got the idea that there must be a lot of books published involving hackers and how they hack. I started to seek them out to see if any of them were any good.

What I discovered was that you could categorize these hacker books into two broad categories. In one category, the author does not really understand hacking at all and does not even attempt to describe how anything is done. I call this the “Harry Potter School of Hacking”: the hackers do a lot of hand-waving and say a lot of magic words like “Sending spike now!” or “Breaking encryption, this will just take a couple of seconds,” but you never really see how they accomplish those tasks. A good example of this kind of hacker storytelling is The Zenith Angle by Bruce Sterling. I loved the story, but Harry Potter might as well have been the main character because the hacking accomplished is magically done.

In the other category, the author has spent some time trying to understand hacking culture and to describe exactly how the hacker did what he or she did. A good example of this kind of storytelling is The Blue Nowhere by Jeffery Deaver, which I reviewed for a previous Cybersecurity Canon post. Deaver gets the technical details right by describing real-world and fictional tools that the two main hackers use against each other. The Girl with the Dragon Tattoo also falls into this latter category. Not only is it a fantastic story, but Larsson also gets the technical details right.

You probably have seen the popular movie versions, but this is one case where you definitely need to check out the book.

The Story

The Girl with the Dragon Tattoo is a ripping-good detective story set in the vicinity of Stockholm, Sweden, during a time when the only way to connect to the Internet from your home was with inexpensive modem lines or expensive ADSL lines.

The story revolves around a disgraced journalist, Mikael Blomkvist, who agrees to take a research case from a very old family patriarch, Henrik Vanger. The case involves the disappearance of Vanger’s favorite niece, Harriet, some forty years prior.

At a family gathering on their private island, Harriet disappeared without a trace. The local law enforcement officials suspected a runaway, then suicide, then murder, but were unable to find any meaningful clues one way or the other. Vanger suspects murder and is convinced that someone in his own family was behind the crime, but because the members of his extended family all vehemently hate each other and have a long list of fetishes and prejudices, any one of them could have had the motive to do it.

For the seven years before Harriet disappeared, she gave Vanger a framed exotic flower to hang on his wall for his birthday. For the next thirty-seven years after Harriet’s disappearance, he anonymously received another framed exotic flower in the mail on his birthday. Each flower is a reminder that Harriet is gone, that Vanger has no clue what happened, and that the person sending the flower may be the killer, taunting him. Before he dies, which could be very soon, Vanger wants resolution and hires Blomkvist to solve the case.

With the mystery laid out, Larsson walks the reader through what he really wants to talk about: a culture of violence against women. The working title to the book before he published it translates as Men Who Hate Women, so you know what Larsson had in mind. Lisbeth Salander is the tattooed girl referred to by the book’s title. She is an orphan, a ward of the state, a hacker with a photographic memory who works for a private investigation firm, and a young woman who refuses to be a victim.

Lisbeth is an amazing character — a real woman with strengths and flaws but who can be held up as someone to admire for her intelligence and determination. Blomkvist hires her to help him with the Vanger mystery, and although the story is told from Blomkvist’s perspective, you come to realize that the story is really about Salander.

The Tech

The story is so engulfing that when I read it for the first time, I got through about 75 percent of it and realized that I had not seen a lot of hacking by the Tattoo Girl. All that Larsson did describe was a lot of innuendo. Phrases like “the Tattoo Girl hacked my password and looked at my hard drive” pepper the narrative, but Larsson would never explain how Salander hacked things.

I was ready to chalk the entire book up as a good read, but put it squarely in the Harry Potter School of Hacking stories, when I arrived at the second climax of the story. There are two parallel plots running through the book, and the final climax is where the hacking comes in. Larsson describes in fairly good detail how Salander was able to defeat an e-mail encryption scheme central to one of the story’s main resolutions, install a piece of stealthy malcode over time, remotely control a bad guy’s Dell laptop with her Apple MacBook (I think there is a political statement in there somewhere), and reroute his money stored in numerous bank accounts around the world to equally numerous anonymous accounts that she had sole control over. The hacking description is very realistic.

Conclusion

If you like mysteries and if you like stories about hackers, you have to read this book. Be warned: there are a number of scenes that Larsson describes in gory detail regarding the sexual abuse of women. But it’s because of the hacking explanations that I think The Girl with the Dragon Tattoo is Canon-worthy – the techniques described and outcomes created are realistic.

Start with the book, but I’d also recommend you watch both movie versions of the book: the original 2009 Swedish version with Noomi Rapace as Salander and the American 2011 remake with Rooney Mara as Salander. Both actresses provide a compelling and completely different take on Salander, and each is fascinating to watch.

The Cybersecurity Canon: Fatal System Error

For the past decade, I have had this notion that there must be a Cybersecurity Canon: a list of must-read books where the content is timeless, genuinely represents an aspect of the community that is true and precise and that, if not read, leaves a hole in a cybersecurity professional’s education. I’ll be presenting on this topic at RSA 2014, and between now and then, I’d like to discuss a few of my early candidates for inclusion. I love a good argument, so feel free to let me know what you think.

Fatal System Error: The Hunt For New Crime Lords Who Are Bringing Down the Internet (2010) by Joseph Menn

If you are interested in the evolution of cyber crime, Fatal System Error is a good first reference. The author, Joseph Menn, is able to capture the early years of the cyber criminal community as it was just beginning to productize its cyber business and professionalize it so that it ran more like a business.

Most of this book is about the incipient history of cyber crime. Menn tells the story through two early cybersecurity practitioners: a very young Barrett Lyon—an early cybersecurity services businessman who built one of the first denial of service protection companies called Prolexic Technologies—and Andy Cocker, who at the time was an agent for the UK’s National Hi-Tech Crime Unit.

Menn also manages to sprinkle in a discussion of some of the significant cybersecurity milestones from around 1995 to about 2009. He talks about the rise of cyber espionage and one of the first public discoveries of a state-sponsored amateur hacker group called the Chinese Network Crack Program Hacker (NCPH) group.

Menn also describes one of the first and most notorious known organized cyber crime syndicates called the Russian Business Network (RBN) which was virtually untouchable by law enforcement during this period. The owner of the syndicate was the son of a high-placed political official, so even if a Russian police officer felt the urge to arrest this cyber criminal, there were powerful forces within the Kremlin that made it a good idea not to.

Menn also covers the familiar ground of Estonia, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan where attackers first proved that cyber warfare was possible, and he documents some of the first uses of distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks as an extortion tool. He explains the rise of bulletproof-hosting providers (essentially criminal Internet service providers) and the impotence of US law enforcement when tracking Russian cyber criminals during this period. In fact, Menn almost takes relish in describing the complete lack of respect for the FBI from the cybersecurity community during this time.

The Story

These details are side stories. The bulk of the book is about the rise of cyber crime. Lyon’s story is how he was sucked into protecting some less-than-savory companies that dabbled in offshore gambling and porn. Organized crime rings ran most of these operations, and the criminals involved were not above trying to sabotage their competitors’ efforts.

Offshore gambling became popular about the same time that hackers discovered that it was possible to launch DDoS attacks that could take a website or a data center offline by simply bombarding it with random data streams from thousands of computers – a botnet – around the Internet. These new cyber criminals used those kinds of tools against their competitors in an effort to drive them out of business. Lyon’s company owned the technology that could mitigate these kinds of attacks, and the organized crime operators came calling to get his help. Lyon’s story is about how he naively gets involved with these cyber criminals and subsequently tries to get himself out of the situation. It was not easy.

Cocker’s story is a bit different. He was an old-school British police officer frustrated with the inability of law enforcement to break down jurisdictional lines across international borders to arrest known cyber criminals. He and his National Hi-Tech Crime Unit decided to do something about it. Instead of waiting for Russian law enforcement to be compelled by political leaders to cooperate, Cocker went into the Eastern Bloc countries to build relationships with local law enforcement officials who were just as eager to bring these new cyber criminals to justice as he was. He had one tried-and-true method to accomplish this task: drink lots of vodka together. Over time, he built trust and friendships with his Russian counterparts and had amazing success arresting cyber criminals in the area.

Menn got a lot of help writing this book from various prominent cybersecurity researchers and journalists at the time. He singles out important commercial cybersecurity intelligence organizations like iDefense, Team Cymru, and SecureWorks. He pointedly casts disdain on several anti-virus vendors as being ineffective, including Kaspersky Lab and the perception that Russians were falsely persecuted by the rest of the world in terms of who was responsible for cyber crime, cyber hacktivism, and cyber warfare.

I do have a couple of quibbles with Menn’s story. He claims that RBN was the main force responsible for the DDoS attacks against Estonia and Georgia. While it may be true that computers within the RBN botnet system participated in those offensive attacks, I do not find Menn’s evidence compelling that RBN leaders orchestrated the attack on their own.

Both attacks had too much precision—some would say military precision—to be run from a civilian organization. I also do not like the way that Menn jumps back and forth in the timeline. For example, in one chapter, he will talk about events in 2008, jump to events in 2002, and then jump ahead to significant events in 2006. He makes it tough for the reader to understand the narrative arc. I would have appreciated a straight-up timeline to keep everything straight. But these are small quibbles. I do not have any compelling evidence either about who is responsible for the Estonia and Georgia attacks, so who am I to criticize the way that Menn tells this complicated story?

Conclusion

If you are interested in the evolution of cyber crime, Fatal System Error is a good reference. If you read this book and another that I just recently reviewed, Kevin Poulsen’s Kingpin, you will have a fairly thorough understanding of the cyber criminal world. Fatal System Error is a vital historical reference for the cybersecurity community. It is worthy of being a part of the Cybersecurity Canon, and you should have read it by now.

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