The New and Improved macOS Backdoor from OceanLotus

Introduction

Recently, we discovered a new version of the OceanLotus backdoor in our WildFire cloud analysis platform which may be one of the more advanced backdoors we have seen on macOS to date. This iteration is targeted towards victims in Vietnam and still maintains extremely low AV detection almost a year after it was first discovered. Despite having been in the wild for an extended period of time, the operation appears to still be active. During our analysis, we were able communicate directly with the command and control server as recently as early June 2017.

While there seem to be similarities to an OceanLotus sample discovered in May 2015, a variety of improvements have been made since then. Some of the improvements include the use of a decoy document, elimination of the use of command line utilities, a robust string encoding mechanism, custom binary protocol traffic with encryption, and a modularized backdoor.

 

Infection Vector

The new OceanLotus backdoor is distributed in a zip file. While we don’t have direct evidence for the initial infection vector we presume it’s most likely via an email attachment. Once the user has extracted the zip file, they see a directory containing a file with a Microsoft Word document icon. The file is actually an application bundle, which contains executable code. (see Figure 1).  Once the user double clicks on the purported Word document, the Trojan executes and then launches Word to display a decoy document.

The malware uses the decoy document to help mask the execution of the malware. This technique is a common one for Windows-based malware, but rare on macOS. In order to achieve this layer of obfuscation, the malware author had to trick the operating system into believing the folder is an application bundle despite the .docx extension. Traditionally, macOS malware have emulated legitimate application installers such as Adobe Flash, which was how the previous version of OceanLotus was packaged.

Figure 1. Context menu and file listing

 

Once the application bundle is launched, it opens a hidden file in the bundle’s Resources folder named .CFUserEncoding which is a password-protected Word document (see Figure 2). It also copies this file to the executable path and essentially replaces the application bundle after persistence has been set up. This would lead the victim to believe that nothing was amiss, as they thought they were opening a Word document and a Word document opened. In this case, the Word file has the name “Noi dung chi tiet.docx”, which is Vietnamese for “Details.”

Figure 2. Decoy document prompts for a password to open the file

Persistence

Compared to the previous version of this backdoor, the persistence mechanism for this remained largely the same. This version creates a Launch Agent  that runs when the victim host starts up, where as in the previous version execution was upon when a user logs in. It also copies itself to a different location and filename based on the UID of the user who ran the application.

For a user other than root, it takes the MD5 hash of the structure returned by getpwuid() and breaks the hash down into segments <first 8 chars of hash>-<next 16 chars of hash>-<last 8 chars of hash>. This segmented MD5 hash is prepended with “0000-“ then used as a directory in ~/Library/OpenSSL/ to store the executable file (see Figure 3). If the user is root, the executable is stored in the system wide library directory at /Library/TimeMachine/bin/mtmfs.

It is interesting to note that the executable and plist locations look like legitimate applications.

UID plist Location Executable Location
0 /Library/LaunchDaemons/com.apple.mtmfsd.plist /Library/TimeMachine/bin/mtmfs
> 0 ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.apple.openssl.plist ~/Library/OpenSSL/0000-<segmented MD5 hash>/servicessl

Figure 3. plist and executable names and locations based on UID

 

Once the malware has set up persistence, it deletes the application bundle from the executable path leaving the decoy document in its place and launches itself as a service from the new location.

No Command Line Utilities

One of the first things we noticed about this backdoor is the lack of suspicious strings which often times provides context as to what the malware might do on a victim host. In most macOS malware, calls to the system() or exec() functions  to run additional scripts are in place. In this case, these were not present nor were there command line utility strings that may easily convey the malicious intention of the application. This shows a deep level of understanding of the macOS platform by the author of this backdoor compared to other threat actors that will commonly copy and paste scripts from the Internet.

The lack of these strings may also double as an anti-analysis technique to make the malware seem less suspicious, especially to basic static analysis.

String Decoding

Since there appear to be no obvious suspicious strings in plaintext, we move onto the possibility of use of encoded, or obfuscated strings.

The string decode routine for this backdoor is an upgrade from previous versions in which strings were XOR encoded with the word “Variable” as a key. The string decode routine now consists of a combination of bit shifting and XOR operations with a variable key that depends on the length of the string that was encoded. If the computation for the variable XOR key turns out to be 0, the default XOR key of 0x1B is used. Figure 4 shows a Python implementation of the decode function.

Figure 4.  Python implementation of the malware’s string decode function

 

After decoding the strings (see Figure 5), we can glean that the malware sets up persistence, surveys the victim’s computer, and sends this information back to a server. At this point, it is still not obvious that this malware contains backdoor functionality.

Figure 5. List of decoded strings

Custom Binary Protocol and Encrypted Traffic

The threat actors responsible for this malware appear to have spent some amount of effort to develop their own custom communication protocol. They did not simply use an off-the-shelf web server for their command and control server, as is commonly done. Instead, they created their own command and control mechanism.

The backdoor uses a custom binary protocol on TCP port 443, a well-known port that is unlikely to be blocked by traditional firewalls due to its use in HTTPS connections. The packet seen in Figure 6 is encoded with a combination of bit shifting (see Figure 7) and XOR with a key of 0x1B before it is sent. The bits are always rotated to the left 3 times before doing the XOR operation. This is an improvement from the previous version where the packet was only XOR encoded with a key of 0x1B.

Figure 6. Initial packet sent by the client to the server

 

Figure 7. Bit shifting function used in the encode/decode routine for network packets

 

After decoding the packet, we can see a breakdown of different fields. Figure 8 shows the initial packet sent by the client to the server. It is relatively empty aside from the “magic” bytes, length of data and type of communication.

Figure 8. Initial packet sent by the client to the server (decoded)

 

Depending on the command response sent from the server, a packet may be bigger than 0x52 bytes. Data beyond 0x52 bytes is zlib compressed then encrypted with AES in CBC mode with a null initialization vector (IV) and a key sent from the server that is padded to 32 bytes.

We captured live traffic from the server, and observed that the encryption keys sent from the server are ephemeral. This means that each new session with the server is given a different key used to encrypt data sent back and forth within that session. This is a marked improvement compared to the previous version, where only XOR encoding with a one-byte key was used for encryption.

After decoding the packet it receives from the server, the backdoor validates certain fields like the “magic” bytes and makes sure the length of the data being received is not over a certain amount. Throughout the program execution, it also checks and handles any errors that may have been generated.

Command and Control Communications

The command and control server communication sequence is as follows:

  1. The client initiates a session with the server by sending a packet with 0x2170272 in the command field.
  2. The server then responds with an ephemeral encryption key and a command.
  3. The client checks if the received packet from the server is valid.
  4. The client executes the command sent by the server and responds with a zlib compressed and AES encrypted blob of the result then sends this back to the server.

Unlike the previous versions of OceanLotus where the commands can be easily gathered from its strings, the author has obfuscated the functions with constant values. We decoded the following available commands as seen in Figure 9.

Command Command Description
0x2170272 Initialize
0x5CCA727 ???
0x2E25992 receive file from server
0x2CD9070 get info on a file / directory
0x12B3629 delete file / directory
0x138E3E6 ???
0x25D5082 execute function from a dynamic library
0x25360EA send file to server
0x17B1CC4 ???
0x18320E0 send victim and computer information together with the backdoor’s watermark
0x1B25503 execute a function from a dynamic library
0x1532E65 execute a function from a dynamic library

Figure 9. List of commands available

Command 0x2170272

When the backdoor is launched, a file is created in /Library/Preferences/.files or ~/Library/Preferences/.files depending on the victim’s user ID. This file (see Figure 10) contains a timestamp and the victim’s name concatenated with the machine’s serial number which is then hashed twice with MD5. This is then copied to a buffer that is 0x110 bytes long and AES encrypted in CBC mode with a null IV and a key of “pth”. It is then saved into the file.


Timestamp + MD5(MD5(<victim’s name + machine serial number>))


After this file is created, the client sends its first packet to the server with 0x2170272 in the command field. The server acknowledges and responds with the same command and the client verifies that the file has been created.

\xa7\xf1\xd9*\x82\xc8\xd8\xfe4137674062B3226FE630C24F7DE1021E\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00

 

Figure 10. Decrypted contents of ~/Library/Preferences/.files

 

Command 0x18320E0

The server then sends this command with an ephemeral key shortly after it sends the 0x2170272 command. The client gathers all the data seen in Figure 11, encrypts it with the key provided by the server and sends it back. One thing to note is the Base64 string that is sent in this packet. This string is static in the binary and does not change, which may be indicative of a marker for campaign or version identification.

\x00\x00\x004137674062B3226FE630C24F7DE1021E\xe9\x0f\x00\x00\x00Mac OS X 10.X.X\xb6\x03\x00\x00

\x00username\t\x00\x00\x00localhost\x18\x00\x00\x00Ze0pXcpfbqbS4wD0eS/LVQ==\xb6\xbc\x1cY\x00\x00\x00\x00M\x00\x00\x00/Users/username/Library/OpenSSL/0000-ABCDEF01-23456789ABCDEF01-23456789/

servicessl\x8b\xbc\x1cY\x00\x00\x00\x00\x17\x00\x00\x00en0 : AA:BB:CC:DD:EE:FF[\x00\x00\x00lo0 : fe80::1\nlo0 : 127.0.0.1\nlo0 : ::1\nen0 : fe80::aaaa:bbbb:cccc:111\nen0 : 192.168.1.254

\x05\x01\x00\x00f\x00\x00\x00Model ID:iMac8,1\nCPU:Intel(R) Core(TM)2 Duo CPU     T7700  @ 2.40GHz\nMemory:4.00\nSerial No:XXXXXXXXXXX\x00\x00\x00\x00

 

Figure 11. Decrypted contents of a packet sent by the client to the server

 

Not highlighted in Figure 11 but also included in this packet is the kernel boot time which may be used by the C2 server to help determine if the backdoor is being run in a sandbox environment.

 

Commands 0x25D5082, 0x1B25503, 0x1532E65

These commands load a dynamic library using dlopen() and obtains a function pointer to execute within that shared library using dlsym(). Unfortunately, we do not know which dynamic libraries or functions are used for each command since these are server supplied and we were not able to capture any communication that used these commands.

However, we can postulate that since the parameters to the functions have the same number of arguments with the first being a fairly large constant similar to the command constants, (see Figure 12) and the backdoor has a function for receiving files, it is possible that these functions correspond to a shared library that the server uploads to the victim host. This means that additional functionality can be added to this backdoor by loading modules directly from the C2 server.

Figure 12. Snippets showing loaded function pointers and their parameters

 

Conclusion

Most macOS malware in the wild today are not very complex, but threat actors have been quickly improving their tradecraft. The increased level of sophistication and complexity may be indicative of increased targeting of macOS hosts looking to the future. With this OceanLotus attack in combination with recent macOS versions of the Sofacy group’stoolset, we have now observed multiple espionage motivated threat actors targeting macOS. It is imperative that the same types of strong security practices and policies organizations use to defend Windows devices are applied universally to include macOS devices as well.

Apple has already updated the macOS protection systems to address this variant of OceanLotus.

Palo Alto Networks customers are protected and may learn more via the following:

  • Samples are classified as malicious by WildFire
  • Domains and IPs have been classified as malicious and IPS signatures generated
  • AutoFocus users may learn more via the OceanLotus tag

Indicators of Compromise

Hashes

b33370167853330704945684c50ce0af6eb27838e1e3f88ea457d2c88a223d8b  Noi dung chi tiet.zip

b3cf3e3b52b4b899cd0814fc75698ea24f08ce18642665adcd3555a068b5c16d  Info.plist

07154b7a45937f2f5a2cda5b701504b179d0304fc653edb2d0672f54796c35f7  Noi dung chi tiet

82502191c9484b04d685374f9879a0066069c49b8acae7a04b01d38d07e8eca0  PkgInfo

f0c1b360c0b24b5450a79138650e6ee254afae6ce8f6c68da7d1f32f91582680  .CFUserEncoding

e84b5c5152d8edf1e814cc4b4975bfe4dc0063ef90294cc96b383f523042f783  info.icns

 

C2 Server

call[.]raidstore[.]org

technology[.]macosevents[.]com

press[.]infomapress[.]com

24h[.]centralstatus[.]net

93.115.38.178

 

Dropped Files

UID == 0 UID > 0
/Library/LaunchDaemons/com.apple.mtmfsd.plist ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.apple.openssl.plist
/Library/TimeMachine/bin/mtmfs ~/Library/OpenSSL/0000-<segmented MD5 hash>/servicessl
/Library/Preferences/.files ~/Library/Preferences/.files

 and 

[Palo Alto Networks Research Center] 

How Can We Make the Cybersecurity Profession Agile?

Two of the most pressing cybersecurity tasks of our time are the need to dramatically grow the size of the workforce, and to create one that is agile enough to keep up with the shifting sands of today’s business landscape. Infosec Europe’s keynote panel session “Building an Agile Security Team for the Future,” chaired by (ISC)²s EMEA managing director Adrian Davis, saw leading frontline professionals from travel search giants Skyscanner, to transport operator Network Rail and the UK government, discuss how these challenges might be addressed.

The first key insight was that an agile cybersecurity team cannot have fixed, traditional role boundaries. Having fluid job roles allows cybersecurity professionals the ability to learn new skills, aspire to achieve managerial positions and help other business units by working outside their “techie” comfort zones. Crucially, the ability to transcend fixed role boundaries gives the flexibility to adapt to a diverse array of threats. Network Rail CISO, Paul Watts, explained how professionals in his team are constantly talking to, and working with, professionals from other teams and departments, as they recognise that innovations must draw on as wide a pool of expertise as possible, and that cybersecurity now encompasses all business units.

Vicki Gavin, head of information security at The Economist Group explained that the key to achieving a team that transcends traditional role boundaries was to “hire for inclusivity, not exclusivity.” Pruning the job specs helped to draw in a more diverse pool of talent. Women, for example, are less likely to apply for roles with lengthy job specs, unless they believe they are fully competent at each one of them. It is also vital to remove unconscious bias from the recruitment process; for example, building role profiles around the last person who did the role means that recruiters are continuously hiring the same kind of person – largely older males – and failing to open doors to millennials, women and people from other professions.

Rather than exclusively hiring qualified off-the-shelf tech specialists, cybersecurity employers should broaden the talent net by hiring for attributes, rather than qualifications, and investing more in training. Instead of recruiters searching for superman. The truth is that it may be necessary to build superman from scratch. There are many ways to attract new people into the industry, and the answer can be on your doorstep. Watts explained that he found someone in marketing who had an interest in cybersecurity, but no experience in the role. He offered her a brief secondment with his team and she quickly picked up the skills and brought a completely new perspective to the team.

The panel remarked that while traditional recruits to the industry can be risk-averse and afraid of chaos, an agile security team is one that is innovative, prepared to “fail forward” and “doesn’t ask for permission, but asks for forgiveness.”

In a world where cybersecurity transcends any one business department, an agile security team must also be one that can speak the language of every business unit, from the board to the marketing team. It must be a team as diverse as the business it operates in, and a team that has technical knowledge garnished with soft skills. As one panellist remarked “in an increasingly amorphous industry, we need an amorphous workforce.”

[(ISC)² Blog]

Digital Forensics Professionals Encountering New Challenges

When I began performing digital forensics more than 10 years ago, things were relatively simple. At that time, the complexity of digital forensics revolved around ensuring each artifact of relevance was identified, and the proper tools to analyze them were available to leverage against computers used by the suspect.

The computer(s) of the suspect were typically the only focus. In some instances, we were also having to deal with mailbox exports of corporate users. When mobile devices came onto the scene in 2008 timeframe, our single device analysis approach to investigations was disrupted significantly. What are these things? Why don’t my hard drive forensics tools work on phones? We “forensicators” had no idea what challenges we would face in the next decade.

The significant challenges facing digital forensics experts today are the vast amounts of devices and locations that may house the valuable information. It is no longer always the case that all data sought to derive a conclusion is on a single device or in a single location. While it is now common to analyze both the computer(s) and phones used by the suspect, there now must be consideration given to other mobile devices (tablets), cloud-based email, cloud-based storage, social media activity, game consoles, IoT devices and even wearables.

Forensics tools for mobile devices were historically valued based on how many phones were supported. We are now arguably down to four phone types that you will likely encounter. Even now as the forensics tools have advanced considerably, the collection of mobile devices requires different approaches than computers. In many instances, the trusted full forensic image of the evidence is not always available – only the data the phone manufacturer will allow you to have. With the drastic reduction in the types of phones you will now encounter, the value is now in the parsers for the applications. With the millions of mobile applications available, and the frequent updates, it continues to be a challenge for the mobile phone forensic platforms to keep up with the rapid pace.

Over the past decade, users have traded in their locally stored email from their Internet service provider (ISP) for the convenience of webmail platforms such as Gmail, Yahoo Mail, or Outlook.com. When users are using webmail services, it is very unlikely that their email will be stored locally and, compared to years past, only fragments of the email are available in Internet cache files. Depending on the nature of the investigation, forensicators may be given the needed access to collect this information from the provider for analysis. When involved in internal investigations involving employees, it is very unlikely that forensicators will be given this access. In addition, even if you can obtain the webmail credentials from the device analyzed, you are not permitted to log into their personal email account. Therefore, the Internet histories and limited file fragments are all that will be available.

This same scenario now applies to personal files as users have migrated this information to cloud-based storage such as Box, Google docs and Dropbox. The same difficulties as webmail email exist.

There are few investigations that do not have a social media component, either directly or indirectly. While Internet histories may demonstrate the usage of these sites, the available information related to all activity and communications can be difficult to extract from the device alone. While the social media providers likely have extensive activity available for each user, this information would require subpoena power that you may or may not have.

Lastly, the IoT phenomenon is also significantly impacting the digital forensics field to provide types of information we have not had in the past. From Internet cameras to fitness wearables, anything electronic may now be a potential target for collection and analysis. However, IoT devices pose similar challenges to that of mobile devices in 2010. There are thousands of different types of devices and little to no standardization. With that diversity and chaos, there are challenges for the collection, parsing, and analyzing of this information. As the mobile device forensic platforms exploded and faced challenges a decade ago, I predict the same for IoT devices going forward.

The overall goal of forensic analysts is to have confidence that every artifact has been properly identified, parsed and analyzed for an accurate conclusion. We have digital artifacts that we never dreamed of years ago. With the diversity of information and numerous locations where pertinent data may now be stored, it is a challenge to be certain you have everything you need.

I suggest that forensicators be patient, yet diligent, with the data sources available. As an artifact points to a data source that is not currently available, regroup and seek that information for additional analysis.

Editor’s note: For more insights on digital forensics, visit www.isaca.org/digitalforensics, and watch a related video at https://youtu.be/ZUqzcQc_syE.

Bill Dean, Senior Manager, LBMC Security

[ISACA Now Blog]

In Era of Digital Disruption, ISACA is Ready to Rise to the Occasion

Much of what I learned about being a professional – and being part of a professional community – came through my association with ISACA.

As the first person in my family to graduate from college, I entered the workforce hungry for the educational resources, networking and professional growth opportunities to make an impact. ISACA provided that and much more, allowing me to envision and embark upon a career trajectory that otherwise would not have been possible.

My professional development was accelerated by pursuing ISACA volunteer opportunities such as helping to coordinate local conferences, which allowed me to make valuable industry contacts and build my project management skills. Eventually I became president of ISACA’s Greater Washington DC Chapter, providing another important opportunity to expand my skill set and learn more about the audit and assurance, governance, risk, and information and cyber security professions. Serving on several ISACA committees and on the board of directors provided further enrichment, both professionally and personally, as I am fortunate to have built treasured relationships with many of ISACA’s 130,000-plus members worldwide.

Now, as the newly installed chair of ISACA’s board of directors, I am grateful for the opportunity to help lead the organization that has provided me so much fulfillment. I’m privileged to work with and on behalf of our global professional community to advance the positive potential of technology in the professions that we serve and society as a whole.

ISACA is nearing its 50-year mark, and with technology-driven challenges and opportunities all around us, there is no doubt we are more relevant than ever. In addition to ongoing activities building toward our 50th anniversary in 2019, there is so much to accomplish in the year ahead. Cultivating a deeper pipeline of leaders in our professions through the Leadership Development Advisory Council, building toward greater societal impact through a revitalized foundation and ensuring ISACA’s Connecting Women Leaders in Technology program becomes even more robust and influential are among many projects for which there is promising momentum.

As we anticipate the progress ahead, I want to express my appreciation for the many contributions of our outgoing board members, as well as our outgoing board chair, Chris Dimitriadis. Chris has led with a calm and good-natured approach, steering ISACA through a period of growth and change while making sure that local chapters and all members of our community are heard and included.

I am delighted that Chris will be part of the smart, dedicated and diverse group of board members for 2017-2018 that will help shape ISACA’s vibrant future:

  • Theresa Grafenstine, CISA, CGEIT, CRISC, CPA, CISSP, CIA, CGMA, CGAP, chair
  • Rob Clyde, CISM, vice-chair
  • Brennan Baybeck, CISM, CISSP, CISA, CRISC, director
  • Zubin Chagpar, CISA, CISM, PMP, director
  • Peter Christiaans, CISA, CISM, CRISC, PMP, director
  • Hironori Goto, CISA, CISM, CGEIT, CRISC, ABCP, director
  • Mike Hughes, CISA, CRISC, CGEIT, director
  • Leonard Ong, CISA, CISM, CGEIT, CRISC, CFE, CIS, CISSP, CPP, CSSCP, ISSAP, ISSMP, PMP, director
  • R.V. Raghu, CISA, CRISC, director
  • Jo Stewart-Rattray, CISA, CISM, CGEIT, CRISC, director
  • Ted Wolff, CISA, director
  • Tichaona Zororo, CISA, CISM, CRISC, CGEIT, CIA, CRMA, director
  • Chris Dimitriadis, CISA, CISM, CRISC, ISO 20000 LA, director and past board chair
  • Robert E Stroud, CGEIT, CRISC, director and past board chair
  • Tony Hayes, CGEIT, AFCHSE, CHE, FACS, FCPA, FIIA, director and past board chair
  • Matt Loeb, CGEIT, director and CEO

While the board will work diligently on ISACA’s behalf, it will take a team effort – all of us collaborating as ONE – to achieve all that we can. We live in a world that is grappling with widespread digital disruption. ISACA can and must be a leading voice in providing a sense of assurance and security as professionals and enterprises navigate a challenging technology landscape.

I know how influential ISACA can be, as evidenced by my own journey. I am proud of what ISACA has meant for myself and so many others, but more than anything, I am energized about the future that we can build together.

Theresa Grafenstine, CISA, CGEIT, CRISC, CPA, CISSP, CIA, CGMA, CGAP, chair of ISACA’s Board of Directors and inspector general of the U.S. House of Representatives

[ISACA Now Blog]

Building Skills and Capacity in the Banking System: A Case Study From India

Indian banks have deployed IT-based solutions to cater to increasing demands in the banking industry required for a growing economy. Adoption of technology has necessitated improving IT-related skills of experienced bankers. Considering the unavailability of internal IT skills, most banks resort to outsourcing IT activities. This has resulted in over-relying on third-party vendors and slackened the pace of acquisition of skills by bank employees.

Considering these limitations, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) – India’s central bank – appointed a ‘Committee on Capacity Building’ that has made recommendations relating to particular areas/components of function, such as recruitment, performance assessment, promotion, placement, job rotation, and skills and capacity building. The committee also has made a number of recommendations for certification of staff in specialized areas, emphasizing that banks should make certification mandatory for the following areas:

  • Treasury operations – dealers, mid-office operations
  • Risk management – credit risk, market risk, operational risk, enterprise-wide risk, information security, liquidity risk
  • Accounting – preparation of financial results, audit function
  • Credit management – credit appraisal, rating, monitoring, credit administration
  • Information and cyber security
  • Governance of enterprise IT (GEIT)

The Indian Banks’ Association (IBA), in consultation with RBI, identified 10 institutes, such as the Indian Institute of Banking and Finance (IIBF), the National Institute of Bank Management (NIBM), ISACA, and others, as certifying organizations. ISACA is identified for its certifications in audit, risk management, security and GEIT.

RBI’s directives for banks
RBI had made a compliance requirement for banks in 1999 to perform annual IS audit of IT-based systems deployed and used by banks, with the report of the audit to be submitted to RBI. The notification recognized CISA as a qualifying certification for conducting IS audits.

Another committee provided guidelines for IT governance, information security, IS audit, outsourcing management, business continuity and compliance in 2011. These guidelines recommended banks to use COBIT 5 or similar frameworks for GEIT. Recommendations for other areas include adopting global best practices, including ISO 27001.

In June 2016, RBI issued a notification for banks specifying compliance requirements for cyber security.

Considering these compliance requirements and skills and competency development requirements, banks have already taken steps to recognize ISACA certifications. Some banks provides examination and membership fees reimbursement on passing the examination.

Role of ISACA certifications in skills development of bank staff
ISACA offers certifications in governance of enterprise IT (CGEIT), risk and control (CRISC), information systems audit (CISA), information security management (CISM) and performance-based cyber security (CSXP).

Certified Information Systems Auditor (CISA)
Most banks have made this certification mandatory for IS auditors, both internal and external.

Certified in Risk and Information Systems Control (CRISC)
Most banks have a defined chief risk officer (CRO) to implement enterprise risk management (ERM); however, there is a gap in aligning them with IT risk. CRISC helps bankers in aligning IT risk with ERM.

Certified Information Security Manager (CISM)
CISM is designed for information security and cyber security professionals including CISOs, information security managers and enterprise leadership.

Certified in Governance of Enterprise IT (CGEIT)
CGEIT is designed for senior management personnel who are responsible for overall governance of IT to ensure that investments in IT realize the expected benefits. This certification is ideal for the CIO, CEO, and members of the board of directors. Considering the RBI’s expectations from banks to implement GEIT, this certification is valuable for bankers in understanding the steps to implement an IT governance framework.

CSX Practitioner (CSXP)
This performance-based cyber security certification provides technical skills for much-needed and critically important cyber security responders working in the area of threat intelligence, incident response, SOC, etc.

Current challenges and next steps
Banking professionals with these skills are needed all over India and in many other countries throughout the world. Therefore, IBA has decided to develop and launch e-learning certification courses, and certifications in other areas are being developed by different institutes.

ISACA’s CISA, CISM, CRISC and CGEIT certifications are experience-based; however, there is some level of preparation required. There are 10 ISACA chapters in India, some of which offer review courses. Many banks officers, therefore, may not have access to the review courses conducted by chapters. However, ISACA is launching online review courses for some of its certifications and has moved to global computer-based testing, which should expand accessibility for bankers interested in pursuing these important certifications.

Sunil Bakshi, CISA, CISM, CRISC, CGEIT, Consultant

[ISACA Now Blog]

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