Six Reasons Why Encryption Back Doors Won’t Deter Terrorists

Last week’s tragic events in Paris, and fears over similar terrorist attacks around the world, have revived a long-standing debate. Early evidence suggests that the terrorists used a readily available encryption appto hide their plans and thwart detection by law enforcement. This has led to finger-pointing by intelligence officials and politicians demanding that something be done to control this dangerous technology. Keep in mind that the terrorists also used multiple other dangerous technologies including consumer electronics, explosives, lots of guns, cars, trains and probably airplanes – but these are better understood and attract less grandstanding about controlling them.

Setting aside the obvious privacy concerns, the argument for weakening encryption ignores a basic question – can this technology really be controlled? More specifically, those arguing for diluted encryption are demanding “back doors” that would allow easier access by law enforcement. For many reasons, this idea simply won’t work and will have no impact on bad guys. It also could have serious unintended negative consequences. Here are a few reasons why:

  1. Encryption = Keeping Secrets

Encryption is more of an idea than a technology and trying to ban ideas generally backfires. For thousands of years, good and bad actors have used encryption to protect secrets, while communicating across great distances.

In the wake of traumatic public events, it’s easy to start thinking that only bad guys need to keep secrets, but that’s clearly not true. Governments must keep important secrets. Businesses are legally required to protect secrets (such as their customers’ personal information) and individuals have reasonable expectations (and constitutional guarantees in many countries) that they can keep their personal data private. Encryption, if properly applied can be a highly effective way to protect legitimate and important secrets.

  1. Who Keeps the Keys to the Back Door?

Allowing government agencies unfettered access to encrypted data is not only Orwellian – it’s also simplistic and unrealistic. Assuming back doors are created, who exactly should have access? Beyond the NSA, FBI, and CIA, should we share access with British Intelligence? How about the French? The Germans? The Israelis? Saudi Arabia? How about the Russians or the Chinese? Maybe Ban Ki-Moon can keep all the keys in his desk drawer at the UN…

As we all know, the Internet doesn’t respect national boundaries and assuming that all countries will cooperate and share equal access to encryption back doors is naïve. But if governments only require companies within their respective jurisdictions to provide back doors, the bad guys will simply use similar, readily available technology from other places.

  1. Keys to the Back Doors Can Easily Get into the Wrong Hands

If there are back doors to encryption, hackers will almost certainly steal and exploit them. As the Snowden revelations demonstrated, large government bureaucracies are not particularly good at protecting secrets or ensuring that the wrong people don’t get access. The OPM hack, which uncovered millions of government employees’ data (purportedly by Chinese hackers), highlights the risks when large numbers of humans are involved.

In a very real way, the existence of encryption back doors would represent a serious threat to data security across the government, business and private sector.

  1. To Control Encryption You Need to Control Math

Ironically, while some government agencies seek to crack encryption, other agencies such as NIST are chartered with testing and validating the security efficacy of encryption algorithms and implementations. The FIPS 140-2 validation process is globally recognized and provides assurance that encryption does not have flaws.

Today’s best encryption is based on publicly vetted and widely available algorithms such as AES-256. Most smart, college-level math majors could easily implement effective encryption based on a multitude of publicly available schemes.

So far I haven’t heard policy pundits recommend that potential terrorists be barred from high-level math education. Preventing clever people anywhere in the world from applying readily available encryption or developing their own encryption schemes is impossible.

  1. The Tools Do Not Cause the Actions

It does appear that the Paris terrorists used commercial encryption to hide some of their communications and it must be acknowledged that this may have hindered law enforcement. They also probably also used off-the-shelf electronics to detonate their explosives, drove modern rental cars to haul people and weapons and perhaps were radicalized in the first place through social media. Today’s technology accelerates everything in ways that are often frightening, but going backwards is never an option. And the tools, no matter how advanced, do not create the murderous intent behind terrorism.

Readily available technology likely made their jobs easier, but in the absence of easy to find encryption tools, the terrorists could have found many other effective ways to hide their plans.

  1. Neutering Encryption Will Hurt Legitimate Businesses

So let’s imagine that in the heat of terrorist fears, the US, UK and a few other governments demand that companies within their jurisdictions create and turn over encryption back doors. Confidence in security technologies from those countries would plummet, while creative entrepreneurs in many other countries would quickly deliver more effective security products.

The growth of the Internet as a trusted platform for business has been closely tied to encryption. The development of SSL encryption by Netscape in the 90s enabled e-commerce and online banking to flourish. And today, encryption is playing a critical role in creating the trust required for today’s rapid growth of the cloud applications.

There are many recent examples of governments trying to legally close barn doors after the horses have long since disappeared. Ironically, the US government already bars the export of advanced encryption technology to rogue states and terrorist groups including ISIS. Clearly this ban had zero effect on the terrorists’ ability to easily access encryption technology.

We live in scary times and should never underestimate the challenges we all face in deterring terror. But latching onto simplistic solutions that will not work does not make us safer. In fact, if we undermine the effectiveness of our critical security technology and damage an important industry, we will be handing the terrorists a victory.

Willy Leichter, Global Director of Cloud Security, CipherCloud

[Cloud Security Alliance Blog]

Never Pay the Ransomer

CryptoWall has struck again—only this time it’s nastier than before. With a redesigned ransom note and new encryption capabilities, BleepingComputer.com’s description of the “new and improved” CryptoWall 4.0 sounds more like a marketing brochure for a well-loved software product than a ransom demand.

Like the iterations of CryptoWall that came before the 4.0 version, the only way to get your files back is to pay the ransom in exchange for the encryption key or wipe the computer clean and restore the files from an endpoint backup archive. The FBI agrees, stating “If your computer is infected with certain forms of ransomware, and you haven’t backed up that machine, just pay up.”

In addition to encrypting the data on an infected machine and demanding a ransom for the decryption key, CryptoWall 4.0 now encrypts the filenames on an infected machine too, leaving alphanumeric strings where file names once were.

The most significant change in CryptoWall 4.0 is that it now also encrypts the filenames of the encrypted files. Each file will have its name changed to a unique encrypted name like 27p9k967z.x1nep or 9242on6c.6la9. The filenames are probably encrypted to make it more difficult to know what files need to be recovered and to make it more frustrating for the victim.

Not unlike Bill Miner, infamously known as the Gentleman Robber, CryptoWall 4.0 makes a farcical attempt at politeness. CryptoWall 4.0’s ransom note reassures its victims that the infection of their computer is not done to cause harm and even congratulates its victims on becoming part of the CryptoWall community, as if it were some sort of honor.

CryptoWall Project is not malicious and is not intended to harm a person and his/her information data. The project is conducted for the sole purpose of instruction in the field of information security, as well as certification of antivirus products for their suitability for data protection. Together we make the Internet a better and safer place.

Ransomware is a lucrative business. It is estimated that the CryptoWall virus alone cost its victims more than $18 million dollars in losses and ransom fees from April of 2014 to June of 2015. In the spirit that being robbed doesn’t have to be a bad experience, CryptoWall 4.0 makes a bad attempt at customer service, claiming “we are ready to help you always.” Additionally,

CryptoWall 4.0 continues to utilize the same Decrypt Service site as previous versions. From this site a victim can make payments, find out the status of a payment, get one free decryption, and create support requests.

In closing, the ransom note states,

…that the worst has already happened and now the further life of your files depends directly on your determination and speed of your actions.

Whether hackers use CryptoLocker, CryptoWall, CTB-Locker, TorrentLocker or one of the many variants, the outcome is the same. Users have no choice but to pay the ransom—unless they have endpoint backup in place. Even with the best tech resources, decrypting the algorithm used to lock files without the key would require several lifetimes. Whereas, with automatic, continuous backup, end users will NEVER pay the ransomer because a copy of their data is always preserved.

Rachel Holdgrafer, Content Business Strategist, Code42

[Cloud Security Alliance Blog]

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